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The recent financial crisis has caused increased
unemployment throughout the world. We focus on
the implications for future labor market perfor-
mance and on a reform proposal for Europe. The
consequences of the present crisis for Europe
depend on whether today’s higher unemployment
reflects a temporary elevation that will recede with
the crisis, or if it will cause an increase in structural
unemployment that will persist beyond the recovery
of the world economy. To analyze this question one
needs a theory that can also explain the evolution of
European unemployment prior to the present crisis.
In particular, the European employment experience
during the last 60 years can be divided into a period
with low unemployment in the 1950s until the mid-
1970s and thereafter a large increase with persistent-
ly high unemployment since the 1980s.
We discuss two theories of the European employ-
ment experience, which have different predictions
for what the unemployment consequences will be of
the crisis and hence, imply different policy recom-
mendations. One theory that has recently gained
much attention is the analysis of Nobel Laureate
Prescott (2004 and 2005) who attributes low
European employment to higher labor taxes in
Europe as compared to that of the United States.
After explaining the mechanics of that macroeco-
nomic analysis (which are not so well-known outside
of the academic profession) and a microeconomic
critique of it, we conclude that Prescott’s theory has
the sanguine implication of unemployment returning
to its pre-crisis level as soon as the world economy
recovers. In contrast, the alternative theory by
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2008) identifies
forces by which the elevated unemployment during
the crisis might result in a persistent increase in
structural unemployment.1 This theory focuses on
how microeconomic turbulence at the worker level
can cause individuals with disadvantageous labor
market outcomes to become discouraged and to
withdraw into benefit dependency.
The risk of increased long-term unemployment con-
stitutes a real threat to Europe with its generous wel-
fare programs. Policy makers would now be wise to
introduce reforms that provide proper incentives to
work as the world economy recovers. Acknowledg-
ing the limits that a social consensus in Europe
exerts on how much benefits can be cut,we advocate
a complementary way of realigning incentives – the
imposition of social work requirements on benefit
recipients. There have been various attempts of
imposing such requirements in the past,but we argue
that those earlier programs have generally failed,
and discuss conditions for succeeding. We conclude
that the present unemployment crisis poses both a
challenge for policy makers as well as an opportuni-
ty to reform social safety nets to permanently im-
prove their effectiveness.
Theory I: taxes and a high labor supply elasticity
In his theory of the European employment experi-
ence, Prescott (2004) focuses on measures of hours
worked per person in working age rather than look-
ing at classifications of inactive individuals as unem-
ployed or as recipients of various welfare benefits.
Table 1 contains three countries that illustrate
Prescott’s thesis where France and Germany repre-
sent and make up a large part of continental Europe.
Employment is depressed in France and Germany
* Stockholm School of Economics and New York University. I
thank the Office of the Swedish Minister of Finance for the oppor-
tunity to discuss the contents of this article and for their comments
at an informal policy seminar.
1 Total unemployment consists of frictional and structural unem-
ployment. Frictional unemployment refers to the normal but time-
consuming process of workers looking for jobs in an economy with
search frictions. We let structural unemployment denote any addi-
tional unemployment that arises in a malfunctioning labor market.
In the analysis of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2008), friction-
al and structural unemployment become synonymous with short-
and long-term unemployment, respectively.by 32 percent and 25 percent respectively,relative to
the United States in 1993–96. Prescott’s (2004)
model can account for these differences as well as
the changes in employment from 1970–74 under the
assumption that only taxes differ across countries
and across time. The tax data in Table 1 shows that
(i) the trans-Atlantic labor tax differential in
1993–96 is roughly 20 percentage points, and
(ii) about half of that differential was already in
place in 1970–74 when European employment was
not depressed relative to the United States (but
rather higher than that of the United States, as
shown in Table 1). Evidently, the labor supply elas-
ticity is very high in Prescott’s model when tax
increases in the order of 10 percentage points can
generate such large reductions in employment.
To understand what gives rise to the high labor sup-
ply elasticity in Prescott’s analysis,we need to review
the aggregation theory of Rogerson (1988).Consider
a large number of households who have to make
labor supply decisions in a static model of a single
period.Labor is indivisible in the sense that a house-
hold can only choose to work either full time or not
at all.2 A household left on its own in such a world,
would choose to work if the wage is high enough and
otherwise choose to stay idle, i.e.
a household’s behavior could be
described in terms of a reserva-
tion wage such that for wages
above (below) the reservation
wage, the household chooses 
to work (to stay idle). But
Rogerson (1988) demonstrated
that this outcome is not an opti-
mal one. Instead, each house-
hold’s expected utility is higher
if it could participate in an
‘employment lottery’, and then
use lottery-outcome-contingent
claims to insure its consumption
against the uncertainty of the
employment lottery. For exam-
ple, a household that chooses a
fifty-fifty chance of working
could hold claims that guarantee
a consumption level equal to
that of an hypothetical person who chooses to supply
labor to half of a job (even though that latter choice
is infeasible since labor is indivisible).By so expand-
ing the choice set of consumption levels (and the
associated probabilities of working), the employ-
ment-lottery equilibrium does not only increase all
households’ expected utility,but it also gives rise to a
high labor supply elasticity. As emphasized by
Prescott (2005, 385), “the aggregate labor supply
elasticity is much greater than the individual labor
supply elasticity”. Specifically, the equilibrium frac-
tion of households working responds sensitively to
small changes in the after-tax wage rate.3
Skeptics have expressed doubts about the microeco-
nomic realism of employment lotteries and markets
for insuring consumption against the lottery out-
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Table 1 
Labor supply, taxes, benefits and benefit dependency
 in working-age population 
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a) Prescott (2004, Table 1), data refers to population aged 15–64; – 
b) Prescott
(2004, Table 2); – 
c) Martin (1996, Table 2), data refers to single-earner house-
holds without dependent spouse in year 1994, including housing benefits; –
d) OECD (2003, Table 4.1), data refers to population aged 15–64, measured on a
full-time equivalent basis.
Sources: Martin (1996); OECD (2003); Prescott (2004).
3A critical assumption in Prescott’s analysis is that tax revenues are
handed back lump sum to the households. If instead tax revenues
were used to finance benefits for the unemployed, equilibrium
employment would plummet much further than what is predicted
by Prescott, as we discuss next in the main text. In contrast, if
instead the tax revenues were used for public goods or wasted,tax-
ation would have hardly any effect on equilibrium employment.
The reason for the latter outcome is that Prescott,like most macro-
economists, specifies a utility function that is consistent with bal-
anced growth. Specifically, in spite of all economic growth in the
last half century, households in the United States continue to work
about the same number of hours per capita,see Prescott (2005).To
be consistent with this fact, the utility function is such that the
income and substitution effects cancel each other when the real
wage increases over time – a higher wage means higher income so
that a household would like to consume more of everything includ-
ing leisure, but a higher wage also means that the relative price of
leisure has gone up so that the household would like to substitute
away from leisure toward consumption of goods.A corresponding
argument (with the opposite signs) would apply to a tax increase
that reduces the after-tax wage. But Prescott’s assumption that tax
revenues are handed back lump sum to households arrests the
income effect and hence, the remaining substitution effect explains
why higher taxes in Europe cause households to work less. For a
further discussion, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006).
2While the assumption of indivisible labor is a stark one,it does cap-
ture salient features in the real world where full-time jobs are domi-
nant and even in the case of part-time jobs, there is considerable
lumpiness in the observed number of hours worked. Reasons for
labor being indivisible could be setup costs such as a worker’s com-
muting time to work,and any startup time at work before an employ-
ee becomes fully productive.For these reasons,a firm that needs e.g.
secretarial services is more likely to hire one secretary full time
rather than eight secretaries, one for each working hour of the day.CESifo Forum 1/2010 9
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comes. In the Handbook of Macroeconomics,
Browning,Hansen and Heckman (1999,602) voice a
common criticism of these models when arguing
that “the employment allocation mechanism strains
credibility and is at odds with the micro evidence on
individual employment histories”. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006) offer still another criticism by show-
ing that the employment-lottery model is not com-
patible with the existence of generous welfare ben-
efits such as those of Europe. For example, if the
French unemployment insurance system replaces
60 percent of lost labor income as suggested by
Table 1, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) show that
Prescott’s model implies that French employment
should be depressed by 66 percent relative to the
United States, i.e. more than twice the actual out-
come.The reason for this counterfactual outcome is
that Prescott’s high labor supply elasticity does not
only make employment respond sensitively to tax
levels but also to benefit levels.
For our present purpose to predict the unemploy-
ment consequences of the current crisis,we conclude
that Prescott’s theory implies that employment will
return to its pre-crisis level as soon as the world
economy recovers. According to Prescott’s analysis,
employment outcomes in the future would only be
different if tax policies were changed.
Theory II: benefits and increased turbulence
The analysis of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and
2008) differs from that of Prescott (2004) in two crit-
ical dimensions: First, the analysis now includes gen-
erous European unemployment benefits, at the level
of the empirical estimates in Table 1. Second, the
disutility of work is much lower than that of
Prescott’s analysis. Because of the lower disutility of
work, Ljungqvist and Sargent’s theory can explain
why European labor market outcomes were not
much different from those of the United States until
the late 1970s despite much more generous benefits
as well as higher taxes in Europe as compared to the
United States.4 According to that theory, European
workers prefer to work and reap their full labor mar-
ket earnings rather than collecting benefits of
around 60 percent of foregone wage earnings. At
least, this was true until the late 1970s.
So what happened at the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s that can explain the outbreak
of high and persistent European unemployment?
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2008) argue that
the cause is an increase in microeconomic turbu-
lence in Europe as well as in the United States and
elsewhere. It is a widely held notion that the eco-
nomic environment has become more turbulent in
the last three decades and, for example, OECD
(1994) suggests that liberalization and deregulation
of markets, heightened technological change, espe-
cially in information technologies, and the trend
towards globalization have contributed to this
development. While not taking any stand on the
precise sources of turbulence, Ljungqvist and
Sargent base their analysis on the well documented
findings of increased labor earnings instability (e.g.
see the survey of Katz and Autor (1999)).As in the
data, turbulence is assumed to impinge on labor
market outcomes for individual workers. The pre-
dictions of the theory is that turbulence should have
led to long-term unemployment in Europe, where
the unemployed with spells longer than one year
should make up approximately half of all the unem-
ployed, but there should not have been much of an
effect on US unemployment outcomes. This is
indeed an accurate characterization of the trans-
Atlantic employment experience since the 1980s
until the present financial crisis.
According to the theory of Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998 and 2008),unemployment benefits with gener-
ous replacement rates are not much of a problem in
tranquil times when laid off workers can find new
jobs with pay comparable to previous earnings. But
the adverse incentive effects of such generous bene-
fits come unleashed in times of economic turbulence
when unlucky workers experience shocks that
diminish their earnings potential – old human capital
becomes obsolete because of new technologies,firm-
specific and industry-specific skills are lost during
restructuring in response to increased international
competition, union wage premia fall after deregula-
tion, etc. Displaced workers in Europe who find
themselves under these circumstances will have a
hard time to find new jobs that are acceptable to
them. Their earnings potential have fallen, yet they
compare any job prospects with their lost earnings
since benefits are based upon past earnings via
replacement rates. Because of the difficulty in find-
4 In fact, European unemployment rates were significantly lower
than those of the United States before the late 1970s (which is con-
sistent with Prescott’s employment data in Table 1 that shows
France and Germany ahead of the United States by 5 percent in the
early 1970s).The analysis of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) attrib-
utes this outcome to European employment protection that
reduces labor mobility and therefore, suppresses frictional unem-
ployment. For a summary of the analysis and the historical record,
see Ljungqvist (2003).ing acceptable jobs,many displaced workers become
discouraged and they reduce their search intensities
in the job market which further exacerbate the
adverse effects of generous benefits in turbulent eco-
nomic times. In contrast, in an economy with stingy
rules for unemployment benefits, such as in the
United States, the theory predicts that the unem-
ployed workers ‘bite the bullet’ and search inten-
sively for less well-paying jobs as compared to their
lost earnings.5
From the perspective of the theory of Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998 and 2008), the unemployment
consequences of the current crisis depend on who
make up the presently swollen ranks of the unem-
ployed. On the one hand, if the additional unem-
ployed are temporarily laid off from firms that
intend to rehire them after the crisis has receded, or
more generally, if the market value of the unem-
ployed’s skills is unaffected by the crisis, the theory
would predict that there is no force other than the
sluggishness of the recovery itself that slows down
the reversion of unemployment to its pre-crisis
level. On the other hand, if the extra unemployed
suffer the type of negative shocks to earnings poten-
tial as the theory uses to explain why Europe has
experienced high long-term unemployment in the
last three decades, then the future outlook for
Europe looks yet bleaker. It becomes more impor-
tant than ever to reform benefit systems in order to
insure proper incentives to work. Before turning to
a reform proposal for Europe,we first discuss recent
research that holds out the promise of settling some
of the dispute between advocates of theory I and II,
respectively.
A life-cycle perspective imparted on theory I and II
Sometimes research in economics leads to surprising
results.At a first glance these results might seem per-
plexing but then they enhance our understanding
and we gain new insights. One such example is
Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2006) inquiry into the
determinants of the high labor supply elasticity
implied by Rogerson’s (1988) aggregation theory
that was used by Prescott (2004 and 2005). In a life-
cycle model, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) close
down the insurance markets and the employment
lotteries, and assume that households must rely on
savings to smooth consumption between times of
working and not working. Under the additional
assumptions of no uncertainty and no accumulation
of human capital, this alternative model (surprising-
ly enough) generates the very same aggregate labor
market outcomes as the employment-lottery econo-
my.But now the households choose fractions of their
lifetimes spent working rather than probabilities to
work in an employment lottery. The implied high
labor supply elasticity is also shown to be numerical-
ly robust in more general settings with both uncer-
tainty and positively-sloped experience-earnings
profiles.
By abandoning the contentious notion of employ-
ment lotteries and replacing it with individuals
choosing career lengths, a consensus should emerge
about the proper objective of inquiry – individual
workers’ lifetime labor supply.6 So what would such
a consensus say about the implication of theory I
that a 10 percentage point increase in German and
French labor taxes can explain why the employment
of these economies is 25 to 32 percent depressed rel-
ative to the United States? The first thought might
be that it lends support to Prescott’s analysis since a
high labor supply elasticity does emerge in a life-
cycle model as long as individual workers’ choice of
career lengths is at an interior solution. It is certain-
ly true that people do not work their entire lives, so
it might seem to follow that their choice of career
lengths is at an interior solution and hence, the
aggregate labor supply elasticity should be high. But
the answer is more complicated than so.
If we were to ask individuals with a strong attach-
ment to the labor force about their planned retire-
ment age, the most common answer would probably
be the official retirement age in the government-run
retirement benefit program. If that is so, individual
workers’ choice of career lengths is not at an interi-
or solution but rather at a corner solution. Many
retirement systems are associated with implicit tax
wedges so as to compel large numbers of workers to
retire at the official retirement age.At such a corner
solution for career length, small increases in labor
taxes would not affect individuals’ planned retire-
ment age because the alternative of enjoying pri-
vately financed early retirement would not be attrac-
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5 For a further concise description of the facts and the theory of
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2008), see Ljungqvist (2003)
from where this last paragraph is excerpted.
6 Prescott (2006a) embraced the Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) life-
cycle framework with indivisible labor as “the initiation of an
important research program … to derive the implications of labor
indivisibility for lifetime labor supply”. While Prescott’s (2005)
original Nobel lecture was devoted to the employment-lottery
aggregation theory,a subsequent version (Prescott 2006b) contains
an added section on ‘The Life Cycle and Labor Indivisibility’.CESifo Forum 1/2010 11
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tive enough. Thus, the reasoning above that seemed
to lend support to theory I fails.
In contrast, Kitao, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008)
enrich and strengthen theory II in an explicit life-
cycle model. While workers originally plan to retire
at the official retirement age in that model,individu-
als who suffer unforeseen negative labor market
shocks will re-optimize their planned career lengths,
especially in Europe where benefits are generous for
the long-term unemployed and for those who claim
disability.The risks for negative earnings shocks are
assumed to be the same for all workers, but the the-
ory predicts that older workers are more prone to
withdraw from active labor market participation in
response to such shocks. The reasons are that older
workers are closer to the official retirement age
which makes it less attractive for them to start
investing in new careers after negative labor market
shocks, and older workers are also at the peak of
their lifetime earnings, so benefits based on past
wage earnings are relatively generous. Hence, the
outcomes of theory II are the same as those stressed
by President Barroso of the European Commission
when he deplores the fact that European workers
“start exiting the labor market on a very large scale
by the time they reach 55 years of age” (European
Commission 2005, 26).
As described, theory II can explain why a more tur-
bulent economic environment since the late 1970s
has caused high long-term unemployment to erupt in
Europe while leaving US labor market outcomes
largely unaffected.The theory predicts correctly that
older workers are the ones who are most likely to
suffer from long-term unemployment.7 Regarding
the elevated unemployment in the present financial
crisis, the same theory warns of dire future unem-
ployment consequences for Europe if the additional
unemployed in the crisis are affected by the kind of
negative individual shocks that have driven the high
European unemployment rate for the last three
decades. If so, the additional unemployed today are
likely to add to the ranks of tomorrow’s long-term
unemployed, and this risk is highest for older unem-
ployed workers. Hence, it is more important than
ever to reform social safety nets so that there are
proper incentives to work as the financial crisis
recedes and the world economy recovers.
Reform proposal: social work requirements
There are two ways of strengthening incentives to
work – the return to working can be increased and
the return to being unemployed can be decreased.
Examples of policy changes that operate on these
two margins are reductions of labor taxes and cuts in
benefits, respectively. There are constraints on how
far any one of these measures can be taken.The fis-
cal needs to finance the extensive welfare states of
Europe place restrictions on how much taxes can be
reduced. Societal preferences or norms impose lim-
its on how much benefits can be cut before benefit
levels are deemed to be too stingy and to not provide
enough of a social safety net for the unlucky ones.
For example, it is probably safe to say that there is a
strong European sentiment that the low benefit lev-
els for the long-term unemployed in the United
States would not be acceptable in Europe.The ques-
tion becomes then how to reform the unemployment
insurance system so that it provides proper incen-
tives while preserving the social fabric of Europe.
One answer is that proposals to decrease the return
to being unemployed do not necessarily have to take
the form of benefits cuts but could also be accom-
plished by reducing the amount of leisure available
to the unemployed.
We propose a system that requires the long-term
unemployed to perform ‘social work’. While differ-
ent forms of work requirements have been tried in
the past,e.g.the so-called one-euro jobs in Germany,
we think that past measures have had limited success
because of failing to address a number of issues that
we lay out below. A common flaw of past measures
has been the lack of an infrastructure that is both
sustainable and commensurate to the size of the
problem of benefit dependency in Europe. To envi-
sion a successful policy reform, we discuss general
principles for program design, particular program
features of concern to participants, and considera-
tions during an implementation phase.8
7 Kitao et al. (2008) analyze also youth unemployment. New labor
market entrants are assumed to go through a phase of inexperience
before they settle into careers.The phase of inexperience is associ-
ated with considerable job churning which explains why young
workers typically experience higher unemployment than adult
workers across countries and throughout time.But why have many
European countries seen additional increases in youth unemploy-
ment rates in the last decades? In the model of Kitao et al. (2008),
it is a challenge to generate such outcomes because young individ-
uals are eager to begin their careers and to accumulate job experi-
ence that will lead to higher earnings.To frustrate those ambitions
in the European economy of the model, it is assumed that there is
a minimum wage that restricts the set of admissible job opportuni-
ties – a barrier that mainly affects inexperienced workers with their
lower potential earnings. On the prevalence of much higher mini-
mum wages in Europe as compared to the United States, see e.g.
Dolado et al. (1996).
8 For an earlier exposition of this line of argument, see Ljungqvist
(1999).Program perspective
(a) Comprehensive and sustainable system: the
sheer size of benefit dependency in Europe calls
for a large-scale reform. A social-work program
should not only accommodate a large number of
benefit recipients but must also be made viable in
the long run.
(b) Delimitation of social work from employment:to
avoid interference with the functioning of a market
economy, clear boundaries must be established
between social-work assignments and regular
employment in the private as well as in the public
sector.The delimitation should be further accentuat-
ed by the feature that social work entitles to the con-
tinued collection of benefits rather than any wages
or salaries.
(c) Useful assignments with few prerequisites:
besides that there is no reason for wasting the
resource that social-work participants constitute,
meaningful assignments help to build general sup-
port for the program. Because of the diverse
backgrounds of benefit recipients and the expect-
ed high turnover in social work, there cannot be
much of prerequisites for social-work assign-
ments.
Participant perspective
(a) Gradual increase of social-work requirements: at
the beginning of unemployment spells,benefit recip-
ients should have most of the time free to look for
jobs. The anticipation of a future imposition of
social-work requirements, like the anticipation of
any future reductions in benefits, strengthens the
incentives to find regular employment.
(b) Self-selection of participants: if the states of
long-term unemployment and regular employment
are not that different in terms of hours devoted to
either social or regular work, individuals with suffi-
cient abilities can be expected to self-select out of
benefit dependency. Though, social work would
continue to provide a meaningful social context to
individuals who cannot make that transition for
various reasons.
(c) Fair and predictable rules: to make social work
feasible for most individuals, the assignments
should neither be too physically demanding nor
involve predominately outdoor tasks. Fairness and
predictability are insured by offering all benefit
recipients the same opportunities and obligations
regarding social work.
Implementation perspective
(a) Gradual phase-in with anticipatory effects: a
full implementation of a social-work program
would take time, but a credible reform announce-
ment followed by a gradual but deliberate imple-
mentation would have immediate incentive
effects. In anticipation of the program’s full imple-
mentation, benefit recipients with sufficient abili-
ties would already start to search for regular em-
ployment.
(b) Promotion of rigorous analysis in mass media: a
major policy reform is meant to have large effects,
but in individual cases there might also be unin-
tended, adverse consequences. To balance the
media’s rightful coverage of such individual cases,
the government must promote an overall analysis of
how the reform will reshape incentives and why that
is necessary for the fiscal sustainability of the wel-
fare state.
(c) Moral and fiscal ‘high ground’: while there is a
wide consensus in Europe to preserve the welfare
state, there are also growing concerns for fiscal sus-
tainability and social cohesion in times of increasing
benefit dependency rates. It is therefore likely that
social work will be deemed as being fair,and be seen
as an opportunity for benefit recipients to make con-
tributions to society in exchange for the support
received.
Challenge and opportunity
While the present unemployment crisis poses a
major challenge for policy makers, it is also an
opportunity to reform social safety nets to perma-
nently improve their effectiveness. The crisis is an
especially opportune time to introduce social work
for benefit recipients. While social work might be
welcomed as a way to create productive activities
for the unemployed until the demand for labor
picks up again, it should be made clear that social
work is here to stay to tackle structural unemploy-
ment in Europe. It could become the reform of the
century.
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